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IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

NO. 47830-2020

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

Canyon County Case N0. CR-2017—

)

V.

1

)

1523

)

DUSTYN KEITH VAUGHN,

)

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)

Has Dustyn Keith Vaughn
it

show

failed to

that the district court

abused

its

discretion

when

revoked his probation and executed his sentence of ﬁve years, With two years ﬁxed, for felony

domestic battery?

ARGUMENT
Vaughn Has
A.

Failed

T0 Show That The

District

Court Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

The

state

in the presence

charged Vaughn With one count 0f felony domestic battery With a traumatic injury

of children, and two counts of injury to a

crash. (R., pp.3 1-33.)

Vaughn’s

girlfriend

was

driving,

child,

stemming from a

July,

2017 car

and her two children, ages 8 years and 15

months, were

sitting in the back.

(R., p.17.)

Vaughn, who was

sitting in the

passenger

seat,

“got

angry and pulled the emergency brake,” causing the car “t0 g0 into a skid,” hitting a power pole.
(R., p.

1

8.)

Vaughn additionally “leaned over and bit” his

Pursuant t0 a plea agreement,

and the

state

placed

The

district court

8.)

guilty t0 domestic battery causing traumatic injury,

March 0f 2019,

sentenced Vaughn to ﬁve years With two years ﬁxed

Following that period of retained jurisdiction, the court

(R., p.1 10.)

jurisdiction.

Vaughn 0n probation
In

1

dismissed both counts 0f injury t0 a child and the “in the presence” enhancement.

(R., pp.80-82, 87, 99, 109.)

and retained

Vaughn pleaded

girlfriend’s nose, injuring her. (R., p.

for a period

0f ﬁve years.

(R., p. 120.)

the state ﬁled a petition for probation Violation, alleging that

violated the terms and conditions 0f probation in a variety of ways.

(R., pp.128-33.)

Vaughn
Vaughn

admitted t0 several probation Violations; nevertheless, the court reinstated Vaughn’ s probation (R.,
pp.144, 149—52.)
In October 2019, the state ﬁled another petition for probation Violation, alleging a fresh

round 0f probation Violations.
(R., p.178.)

The

district court

(R., pp.153-64.)

Vaughn again admitted

revoked Vaughn’s probation.

Violating his probation.

(R., pp.183-84.)

Vaughn ﬁled

a

timely notice 0f appeal. (R., pp.186-88.)

Vaughn argues the district court “did not exercise reason and therefore abused its discretion
by revoking

his probation,” insofar as

could be a productive

member of

Review of the record and

B.

Standard

society and succeed

on probation.”

application of the relevant legal standards

district court that

he

(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)

shows n0 abuse of discretion.

Of Review

“Once a probation
is

he purportedly “demonstrated t0 the

Violation has been proven, the decision 0f whether t0 revoke probation

Within the sound discretion 0f the court.” State

V.

Le Vague, 164 Idaho 110, 113, 426 P.3d 461,

464 (2018) (quotation marks omitted). In evaluating whether a lower court abused
the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry,

which asks “whether the

its

discretion,

correctly

trial court: (1)

perceived the issue as one 0f discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3)
acted consistently With the legal standards applicable t0 the speciﬁc choices available to

reached

its

decision

by

149, 160 (2018) (citing

the exercise 0f reason.”

Lunneborg V.

MV Fun Life,

Vaughn Has Shown N0 Abuse Of The

C.

“A
showing
(Ct.

district court’s

that the court

State V. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272,

and

(4)

429 P.3d

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).

District Court’s Discretion

decision t0 revoke probation will not be overturned 0n appeal absent a

abused

its

discretion.” State V.

App. 2013). “Relevant considerations

in

Day, 154 Idaho 649, 650, 301 P.3d 655, 656

making

this decision are

serving the goals 0f rehabilitation and Whether imprisonment
society.” State V. Kerr, 115 Idaho 725, 726,

all

it;

the circumstances bearing

upon

769 P.2d 602, 603

is

whether the probation

is

necessary for the protection of

(Ct.

App. 1989). “[W]e examine

the decision t0 revoke probation and require execution 0f the

sentence, including events that occurred between the original

pronouncement 0f the sentence and

the revocation ofprobation.” State V. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 672,

962 P.2d 1054, 1056

(Ct.

App.

1998)

Vaughn

violated his probation

by

(1) “possessing

and using methamphetamine” and

marijuana; (2) failing to enroll in a required “domestic Violence treatment program”; (3) failing to
“retain regular

and willing

monthly contact” with a family friend who was “active

to

appointments in

— p.45,

L.4.)

“help [Vaughn] any

May and June

The

district court

way” he

Anonymous”

could; and (4) “fail[ing] t0 attend probation

of 2019.”

(R., p.178;

found that

if

it

in Alcoholics

“were

Aug.
t0 put

Tr., p.18,

L.22 — p.21, L.7; p.41, L.25

[Vaughn] back out 0n probation right

now,”

it

did not “think there’s a good likelihood [he] would be successful.” (TL, p.1

The record

Ls. 12—15.)

1,

in this case supports that ﬁnding.

On appeal Vaughn contends “that the district court did not exercise reason by revoking his
probation because his probation was achieving

adequate protection for society.” (Appellant’s

Given the seriousness 0f the underlying crime

its

rehabilitative obj ective while providing

brief, p.4.)

But

this

claim

is

belied

(ﬂ R., pp.17-18), Vaughn’s

by

the record.

failure to enroll in

domestic Violence treatment raises concerns about whether probation alone sufﬁced for

community

objective, insofar as

Ls.5-1

Moreover, probation was self—evidently not achieving

protection.

Vaughn was continuing

to use drugs While

its

rehabilitative

0n probation. (Aug,

T12, p.42,

1.)

Vaughn argues

that “despite his setbacks

0n probation,” he “showed the

district court that

he was motivated t0 participate in the necessary treatment and get back 0n track.” (Appellant’s
brief, p.5.)

However, the

district court

reasonably rejected this claim below. Per the court,

had recently violated probation once before, and
treatment

plan—and

yet,

he

still

after that, similarly

Vaughn

pledged to maintain a

failed to follow through:

But What really pushes me towards imposing your sentence is the small amount of
time that passed between the last time you were here and the Violation because you
had such a good plan. And I’m not saying I don’t believe you. I think you have
the best of intentions. But honestly I think if I were t0 put you back out 0n probation
right now I don’t think there’s a good likelihood you would be successful. And I
don’t know Why exactly that is because When we were in court before you had such
a great plan, and you have so much support. And I understand What your lawyer is
saying, but things come up in life, and you have t0 deal With those things, whether
it’s your residence 0r whatever, whatever it might be.
But, you know, you knew you had t0 maintain the contact with Bob Skelton,
and you didn’t d0 it. And you knew you had t0 report t0 your probation ofﬁcer,

and you didn’t d0
(Tr., p.1 1, Ls.7-25.)

it.

Thus, While the court
that probation

felt this

was not working

and deep support system (TL,
at probation.

was a “close” case

as intended. Despite

p.1

And Vaughn was

1,

Ls.1 1-17),

(Tr., p.1 1, Ls.5—6),

Vaughn’s “best

18,

reasonably concluded

intentions,

Vaughn quickly accumulated two

,9 ‘6

great plan,”

failed attempts

previously given a second chance at probation but was back t0

using drugs Within a month. (R., pp.151, 156, 178 (showing

on April

it

Vaughn was

2019, and admitted to drug use that occurred as early as

reinstated

May 6, 2019).)

on probation
So,

Vaughn’s

claim on appeal—that this time around, he was “motivated t0 participate in the necessary treatment

and get back 0n track” (Appellant’s

Vaughn
t0

brief,

p.5)—rings hollow. The court was not required t0 give

endless chances at succeeding 0n probation; instead,

conclude

that, despite

Vaughn’s familiar promises

t0

d0

it

was a sound exercise of discretion

better, a third opportunity

would not

have worked.

The record supports

the district court’s ﬁnding that

court “were t0 put [him] back out 0n probation.”

not accomplishing

its

Vaughn would not be

(TL, p.1

goals, the district court did not abuse

successful if the

1,

Ls.12-15.) Because probation

its

discretion.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 afﬁrm the judgment of the

DATED this 9th day of November, 2020.

/s/

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General

district court.
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